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SHOULD ROBOTS PROSECUTE AND DEFEND?
STEPHEN E. HENDERSON
Abstract
Even when we achieve the ‘holy grail’ of artificial intelligence—machine
intelligence that is at least as smart as a human being in every area of
thought—there may be classes of decisions for which it is intrinsically
important to retain a human in the loop. On the common account of
American criminal adjudication, the role of prosecutor seems to include
such decisions given the largely unreviewable declination authority,
whereas the role of defense counsel would seem fully susceptible of
automation. And even for the prosecutor, the benefits of automation might
outweigh the intrinsic decision-making loss, given that the ultimate
decision—by judge or jury—should remain a human (or at least rolereversible) one. Thus, while many details need to be worked out, we might
within decades have a criminal justice system consisting of robo-defense
lawyers and robo-prosecutors. And even if we never do, their consideration
provides another lens through which to consider these roles and, ultimately,
our criminal justice system.
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Introduction
The more things change, the more they stay the same.
In 1956, a group of scientists proposed a summer workshop at
Dartmouth:
We propose that a 2 month, 10 man study of artificial
intelligence be carried out. . . . An attempt will be made to find
how to make machines that use language, form abstractions and
concepts, solve kinds of problems now reserved for humans, and
improve themselves. We think that a significant advance can be
made in one or more of these problems if a carefully selected
group of scientists work on it together for a summer.1
Well, if they work all summer, sure.
Such (naive) hope naturally engendered (exaggerated) concern. In 1964,
President Lyndon Johnson signed legislation creating the National
Commission on Technology, Automation, and Economic Progress, seeking
to reassure a troubled nation that “[a]utomation is not our enemy.”2 The
Introduction to the Commission’s Report, delivered in 1966, acknowledged
that while “[t]he vast majority of people quite rightly have accepted
technological change as beneficial,” there was also ample fear:
Another concern [with technological progress] has been the
apparently harmful influences of modern technology on the
physical and community environment—leading to such
1. NICK BOSTROM, SUPERINTELLIGENCE: PATHS, DANGERS, STRATEGIES 6 (2014).
2. Lyndon B. Johnson, Remarks Upon Signing Bill Creating the National Commission
on Technology, Automation, and Economic Progress, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Aug. 19,
1964), https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/241917. President Johnson continued: “Our
enemies are ignorance, indifference, and inertia. Automation can be the ally of our
prosperity if we will just look ahead, if we will understand what is to come, and if we will
set our course wisely after proper planning for the future.” Id.
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problems as air and water pollution, . . . deterioration of natural
beauty, and the rapid depletion of natural resources. Another
concern has been the apparently harmful influence of urban,
industrial, and technical civilization upon the personality of
individual human beings—leading to rootlessness, anonymity,
insecurity, monotony, and mental disorder. Still another concern,
perhaps the one most responsible for the establishment of the
Commission, has arisen from the belief that technological
change is a major source of unemployment. . . . The fear has
even been expressed by some that technological change would in
the near future not only cause increasing unemployment, but that
eventually it would eliminate all but a few jobs, with the major
portion of what we now call work being performed automatically
by machine.3
It is hardly surprising, then, that as artificial intelligence technologies
continue to mature, humans continue to fret. And so we should. In his
seminal book Superintelligence, Nick Bostrom quickly establishes that a
machine ‘intelligence explosion’ could—as a matter of historical rates of
production—be expected.4 That takes him four pages. He then spends some
three hundred pages articulating countless scenarios of how it could go
sufficiently wrong as to constitute an existential threat to humanity.
Thus, it is natural, and expected, that many of us are wondering what the
achievement of artificial general intelligence, or AGI—meaning broadscale, human-level machine intelligence—might mean for the practice of
law.5 And not everyone is an optimist.
Although they ultimately conclude that “algorithmic governance” can
satisfy the requirements of governmental transparency, Cary Coglianese
and David Lehr begin a recent paper with this rather startling claim:
When Abraham Lincoln declared in 1863 that government “of
the people, by the people, and for the people, shall not perish

3. NATIONAL COMM’N ON TECH., AUTOMATION & ECON. PROGRESS, TECHNOLOGY AND
(1966), https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED023803.pdf.
4. BOSTROM, supra note 1, at 1–4. I do not mean to overstate Bostrom’s careful claim:
It is not that historic gross world product data dictates that we will experience an intelligence
explosion causing another rate-change in exponential growth, but rather that if we do, it will
fit historic trends as opposed to breaking the mold. See id.
5. For a brief primer on artificial general intelligence, see Kiel Brennan-Marquez &
Stephen E. Henderson, Artificial Intelligence and Role-Reversible Judgment, 109 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 137, 143–45 (2019).
THE AMERICAN ECONOMY xi–xii
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from the earth,” he spoke to enduring values of liberty and
democracy. Today, these values appear to face an emerging
threat from technology. Specifically, advances in machinelearning technology—or artificial intelligence—portend a future
in which many governmental decisions will no longer be made
by people, but by computer-processed algorithms.6
Call me a skeptic, but I don’t think the potential for robot government is
akin to what was troubling Lincoln as he prepared his remarks for
Gettysburg, and it requires much more subtle argument—to which
Coglianese and Lehr of course move—in order to determine whether
automated government might meaningfully threaten democracy.7
Milan Markovic has recently argued that “important policy
considerations . . . counsel against replacing lawyers with intelligent
machines.”8 First off, claims Markovic, “most human beings prefer to
interact and conduct business with other humans.”9 I’m again skeptical.
This alleged preference has not stemmed—nor even slowed—the tide of
electronic commerce, nor do I see why it would differently apply to other
sectors where the technology is not yet available. Plenty of humans seem to
prefer even quite dumb machines as they move to electronic banking and
other conveniences, and I count myself among them.10 And if I never had to
visit another human doctor or dentist, what I wouldn’t pay!
More particularly for Markovic,
One consideration is largely practical. Intelligent machines pose
a challenge to the dominant liability regime. If lawyers fail to
deliver competent legal services to their clients, they are subject
to . . . malpractice suits. . . . When lawyer robots err, who should
be held responsible and compensate injured clients?11
6. Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Transparency and Algorithmic Governance, 71
ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2019).
7. See generally id.; see also Brennan-Marquez & Henderson, supra note 5, at 149–56
(arguing that democracy demands certain judgments be “role-reversible,” permitting robots a
role only if they interchangeably sit on both sides of such judgments). See generally Melissa
Mortazavi, Rulemaking Ex Machina, 117 COLUMBIA L. REV. ONLINE 202 (2017) (cautioning
against over-reliance on currently available automation in administrative rulemaking).
8. Milan Markovic, Rise of the Robot Lawyers?, 61 ARIZ. L. REV. 325, 343 (2018).
9. Id. at 327.
10. See, e.g., Survey: Online, Mobile Are Most Popular Banking Channels, AM.
BANKERS ASS’N (Sept. 21, 2017), https://www.aba.com/Press/Pages/092117Consumer
SurveyBankingPreferences.aspx.
11. Markovic, supra note 8, at 343 (footnotes omitted).
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So, a lawyer’s argument against robot lawyers is not knowing whom to sue
when the robot lawyer proves incompetent. All lawyer jokes and American
hyper-interest in litigation aside, this hardly seems unique to the practice of
law. Similar liability questions arise with autonomous vehicles, yet few
expect—and even fewer think it ought—to keep them off the roads. To be
sure, there are fascinating questions of civil liability to be addressed, 12 but
fascinating questions are little reason for preferring death and carnage,
whether it take place on the roads or—more metaphorically—via terrible
representation in our courtrooms. Further, in my particular area of
interest—the criminal law—malpractice liability hardly takes this center
stage. Instead, very few such claims are brought, let alone succeed, because
anyone seeking to recover for malpractice must typically prove not only
that she would have otherwise won her criminal case, but further that she is
innocent of the charges.13
Another of Markovic’s reasons for disfavoring robot lawyers is that
clients “often do not have clear objectives and require assistance in shaping
them.”14 Markovic has no argument, however, explaining why AGI lawyers
could not fulfill this function. Nor does he have arguments supporting his
claims that AGI lawyers could not push back against unethical clients,15
would lack emotional intelligence and moral authority,16 would be unable to

12. See generally Roger Michalski, How to Sue a Robot, 2018 UTAH L. REV. 1021
(arguing for a sui generis robot liability regime, but one that benefits from much that has
come before); Mark A. Lemley & Bryan Casey, You Might Be a Robot, CORNELL L. REV.
(forthcoming) (stressing how difficult it is to delimit what constitutes a robot); Bryan Casey,
Robot Ipsa Locquitur, GEO. L.J. (forthcoming) (arguing traditional negligence is suited to the
task); Andrew D. Selbst, Negligence and AI’s Human Users, B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming)
(arguing ‘not so fast’); Omri Rachum-Twaig, Whose Robot Is It Anyway?: Liability for
Artificial-Intelligence-Based Robots, 2020 U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming) (arguing for some
“supplementary rules”). Again, there are indeed fascinating questions to be answered!
13. See BENJAMIN H. BARTON & STEPHANOS BIBAS, REBOOTING JUSTICE: MORE
TECHNOLOGY, FEWER LAWYERS, AND THE FUTURE OF LAW 89–90 (2017) (explaining these
and other limitations); J. Vincent Aprile II, Exonerating Criminal Defense Attorneys from
Civil Malpractice, CRIM. JUST., Spring 2019, 42–44 (expanding upon the same).
14. Markovic, supra note 8, at 344.
15. See id. at 346. “One especially vital responsibility of attorneys is to push back
against clients’ unlawful and misguided ends. In this regard, the lawyer is a gatekeeper who
functions as a ‘buffer between the illegitimate desires of his client and the social interest.’”
Id. (citation omitted). Again, call me skeptical.
16. See id. at 346. This is not to deny that others have made important claims in this
regard. In addition to that cited by Markovic, see the sources cited infra notes 43, 45.
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explain themselves,17 or would “flood real (or virtual) courts with
unsustainable claims, with harried [human?] judges left to separate the
wheat from the chaf[f].”18
In short, Markovic’s claims seem to sound in speciesism, preferring
human decision-making because it is human, not because it is in any
meaningful way superior.19 Most relevant to my inquiry, he makes the
following claim about criminal prosecution: “[P]rosecutors do not merely
seek convictions on behalf of the state; they are required to ensure that the
accused is ‘accorded procedural justice’” (quoting the ABA Model
Rules).20 Yes, they are so ethically obliged. Do they consistently fulfill that
obligation? Hardly.21 Thus, we cannot merely presume that AGI
prosecutors would do worse.22
All of which raises the question: Is there reason to think AGI lawyers
could never serve as prosecutors or defense counsel? What follows is a
preliminary interrogation. First, Part I comments upon the search for AGI
and upon methodology: because we lack all relevant details of the
technology, we cannot focus upon the robot lawyer, nor imagine for her
limitations that she might not have. Instead, we must begin with the current
human substantiation, attempting to define its role. Part II thus looks to the
American prosecutor and criminal defense lawyer, and Part III asks whether
there is anything about either one for which human decision-making is
intrinsically important. My initial conclusion is that there seems to be no
such need for criminal defense, but that there might be for prosecution,
17. See Markovic, supra note 8, at 347. Markovic does not address questions of
explainable AI, see, e.g., Brent Mittelstadt et al., Explaining Explanations in AI, in FAT*
’19: PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE ON FAIRNESS, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND TRANSPARENCY
279 (ACM Publ’ns 2019), https://doi.org/10.1145/3287560.3287574, let alone take time to
differentiate the many ways we might achieve artificial general intelligence, each of which is
critically—and uniquely—different from the machine learning of today, see, e.g., BOSTROM,
supra note 1, at 26-62.
18. Markovic, supra note 8, at 347.
19. To be clear, Markovic’s claims surely hold for the technologies of today. My dispute
is with the claim that they would similarly apply to those of AGI.
20. Id. at 345 (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8. cmt. 1 (AM. BAR
ASS’N 2018)).
21. See, e.g., Jonathan Rapping, Who’s Guarding the Henhouse? How the American
Prosecutor Came to Devour Those He Is Sworn to Protect, 51 WASH. L. J. 513, 529–38
(2012).
22. In interrogating the potential for judicial robots and other law-related automation,
Eugene Volokh proposes a “Modified John Henry Test” “in which a computer program is
arrayed against, say, ten average performers in some field.” Eugene Volokh, Chief Justice
Robots, 68 DUKE L.J. 1135, 1138 (2019).
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even if—as is ever the case—instrumental gain should be weighed against
any such intrinsic value.
I. Begin with the Humans
The search for artificial general intelligence is decades-old and is as
complicated and contested as it is fascinating.23 But, very briefly, what is it
and when might we have it? Physicist and AI-enthusiast Max Tegmark
helps with both questions.
Tegmark divides life on earth into three stages.24 In the first, Life 1.0, life
evolved to better survive and replicate, and such organisms of course
continue to slowly evolve over many generations.25 They are in a sense
amazing, but they are also rather ‘dumb’: the bacterium knows just as much
on the day it is born as on the day it will die.26 Thus, in the second stage,
Life 2.0, creatures—foremost among them we humans—brought something
new: the capacity to learn, or, as Tegmark puts it, to “design [our]
software.”27 The brain of a human baby is dangerously low on what we
would consider commonplace knowledge, but, thankfully, stock full of
potential to learn.28 So far so good. What can’t we do? Design our own
hardware. Despite some improvements—a new knee here or a new heart
valve there—we remain essentially tethered to a biologically-marvelousyet-limited body that will die on us in a relatively short time, and that can
only be moderately improved by exercise, training, and known methods of
surgery. Thus, Life 3.0, “which doesn’t yet exist on Earth, [will]
dramatically redesign not only its software, but its hardware as well.”29 And
this is, in a nutshell, the goal of—or, more properly said, a prominent goal
of—AI: to develop a human-level and human-breadth intelligence (AGI)

23. For a description of AGI including citations to its key works, see Brennan-Marquez
& Henderson, supra note 5, at 143–45.
24. MAX TEGMARK, LIFE 3.0: BEING HUMAN IN THE AGE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
24–30 (2017).
25. Id. at 25–26.
26. Life 1.0 is “life where both the hardware and software are evolved rather than
designed.” Id. at 27 (emphasis omitted).
27. Id. at 26 fig. 1.1. Life 2.0 is “life whose hardware is evolved, but whose software is
largely designed.” Id. at 27 (emphasis omitted).
28. That “the synaptic connections that link the neurons in [our brains] can store about a
hundred thousand times more information than the DNA that [we are] born with,” allows not
only different and more nimble intelligence, but greater intelligence. Id. at 28.
29. Id. at 26 fig. 1.1.
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that will not be hampered by the ‘hardware’ limitations of slow biological
evolution.30
When will this happen? On a Life 1.0 to 3.0 timescale, in the blink of an
eye.31 But few of us tend to think on cosmic timescales, so how long might
it take in more common measurements? There is robust disagreement,
ranging from the “techno-skeptics” who think we will not reach AGI for a
century, if ever, to the optimistic few who think it might happen very
soon.32 Many believe we are looking at somewhere between a few decades
to a century.33 So, it is not too early to begin to consider AGI’s criminal
justice role.34
How might this revolution come about? We really have no idea. Or,
perhaps better said, we have too many ideas. It might be through a ‘child
machine’ imagined by Alan Turing that ‘grows up’ through some form of
directed or nudged—and hopefully much speedier—evolution.35 It might be
via “whole brain emulation” or “uploading,” in which scientists replicate
30. See id. at 30, 39 tbl. 1.1. “The holy grail of AI research is to build ‘general AI’
(better known as artificial general intelligence, AGI) that is maximally broad: able to
accomplish virtually any goal, including learning.” Id. at 52. Nick Bostrom describes AGI
like this: “Machines matching humans in general intelligence—that is, possessing common
sense and an effective ability to learn, reason, and plan to meet complex informationprocessing challenges across a wide range of natural and abstract domains . . . .” BOSTROM,
supra note 1, at 4.
31. TEGMARK, supra note 24, at 29–30. Tegmark explains:
After 13.8 billion years of cosmic evolution, development has accelerated
dramatically here on Earth: Life 1.0 arrived about 4 billion years ago, Life 2.0
(we humans) arrived about a hundred millennia ago, and many AI researchers
think that Life 3.0 may arrive during the coming century, perhaps even during
our lifetime . . . .
Id.(emphasis added).
32. See id. at 30–33, 40–42.
33. See id. at 30–33, 40–42; BOSTROM, supra note 1, at 22–25. Two early waypoints of
particular relevance to lawyers have been machine learning systems outperforming attorneys
in certain tasks (especially in document review) and correctly predicting judicial outcomes.
See Erin Winick, Lawyer-Bots Are Shaking Up Jobs, MIT TECH. REV. (Dec. 12, 2017),
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/609556/lawyer-bots-are-shaking-up-jobs/ (document
review); Nikolas Aletras et al., Predicting Judicial Decisions of the European Court of
Human Rights: A Natural Language Processing Perspective, PEERJ COMPUTER SCI. 2:e93
(Oct. 24, 2016), https://peerj.com/articles/cs-93/.
34. As Kiel Brennan-Marquez and I have previously noted, any objection that such
planning is futile—i.e., AGI will very quickly lead to overwhelming superintelligence that
will override any such plans—would prove too much. See Brennan-Marquez & Henderson,
supra note 5, at 145.
35. See BOSTROM, supra note 1, at 27–35.
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the computational structure of our own gray matter.36 It might be by
improving the human brain,37 by interfacing with the human brain,38 or by
some linkage between multiple human brains.39 Or it might be something
entirely different. And not knowing the mechanism by which AGI will be
achieved, we cannot know the form or manner that intelligence will take.
Perhaps it will merely be improvement upon our own manners of thinking,
or perhaps it will be something very different. We are fundamentally
hampered in imagining AGI because we know of only a single form of high
intelligence—our own—and because we know eerily little about even it.
We therefore cannot begin with the (unknowable) robot. While we might
ponder whether robots should be subjected to our criminal law,40 we now
see this is an impossible question to answer. While long-evolved doctrines
of actus reus and mens rea might work for the human brain—or might not if
neuroscience really throws us a curve!41—they might be fundamentally
unworkable for an entirely different manner of intelligence. We first need to
know the form or forms of that intelligence, and then we can meaningfully
ponder its criminal law. Thus, we ought to start not with the intelligent
machines, but rather with us. Is there something intrinsically important
about human decision-making, perhaps in certain spheres? Kiel BrenanMarquez and I have previously argued that there is: criminal judgments in
an appropriately democratic society should be “role-reversible,” in that
those making the judgment ought to be susceptible, reciprocally, to the
impact of decisions.42 We should only have robo-jurors, then, if we likewise
interchangeably have robo-defendants.

36. See id. at 35–43.
37. See id. at 43–54.
38. See id. at 54–58.
39. See id. at 58–60.
40. See, e.g., Ying Hu, Robot Criminals, 52 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 487 (2019) (arguing
we should sometimes criminally punish AI); Ryan Abbott & Alex Sarch, Punishing
Artificial Intelligence: Legal Fiction or Science Fiction, U.C. DAVIS L. REV. (forthcoming)
(arguing that such criminal punishment would be morally defensible but not an ideal
solution).
41. What might be most important about a human system of criminal justice is that
humans perceive it to be basically legitimate. See, e.g., Douglas Husak, What Do Criminals
Deserve? in LEGAL, MORAL, AND METAPHYSICAL TRUTHS: THE PHILOSOPHY OF MICHAEL S.
MOORE 3 (Kimberly K. Ferzan & Stephen J. Morse eds., 2016) (“Here, then, is the
legitimate place of crime-reduction in a theory of justified punishment: it provides the most
important rationale for creating institutions that treat persons as they deserve.”).
42. See generally Brennan-Marquez & Henderson, supra note 5.
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It is worth pausing to emphasize that when I speak of AGI—and when
Kiel and I speak of role-reversible AGI—we really mean AGI: a computer
intelligence at least as smart as a human across the entire topology of
human intelligence. If, say, Joshua Davis is correct that intelligent machines
are not likely to achieve the subjective/conscious experience,43 then they are
not yet as intelligent as humans when it comes to philosophy, and they quite
obviously could not engage in generic reasoning triggered by a ‘but for the
grace of god there go I’ influence.44 If human consciousness turns out to be
a self-delusional fiction, it is ample that machines can engage in the same
fiction. But if human consciousness is more, then machines need that too.
Since I tend to be a philosophical materialist, I am cautiously optimistic that
machines will attain this ability—whatever it is in humans. And since that is
what I mean by AGI, my analysis proceeds on that assumption.45
So, what about AGI robo-defense counsel and robo-prosecutors? First,
we must consider their current, human role.
II. The Defense and Prosecution Roles
What is the role of an American criminal defense lawyer? Of a
prosecutor? These definitional questions are complex and have not been
wholly resolved by centuries of debate among ethicists.46 They certainly
will not be resolved here. But since we require some answer in order to ask
whether there is anything intrinsically important about a human in each
role, we must at the very least enumerate some popular conceptions and
attempt to distill their essence.

43. See generally Joshua P. Davis, Artificial Wisdom? A Potential Limit on AI in Law
(and Elsewhere), 72 OKLA. L. REV. 51 (2019). Davis does a tremendous job of weaving
together much of the key philosophical literature in the area, from Descartes to Searle to
Parfit.
44. See Brennan-Marquez & Henderson, supra note 5, at 149–52.
45. Similarly, it would of course alter my analysis if “legal reasoning necessarily
involves the types of normative judgments that are impossible for AI.” W. Bradley Wendel,
The Promise and Limitations of Artificial Intelligence in the Practice of Law, 72 OKLA. L.
REV. 21, 26 (2019). Although I am much more skeptical of claims to attorney
‘exceptionalism’—and to human ‘exceptionalism’—than Wendel, his paper, too, is
necessary reading. My object here is to ask whether we ought to retain human prosecutors or
defense counsel even if machines are capable of such reasoning.
46. See, e.g., Fred C. Zacharias, Fitting Lying to the Court into the Central Moral
Tradition of Lawyering, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 491, 492–94 (2008) (articulating “three
camps” of the “professional responsibility world”).
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A. Criminal Defense
To many, the best single definition of criminal defense remains the
famous words of Henry Lord Brougham. In 1820, Brougham threatened to
cast England into chaos—perhaps civil war—if necessary to defend his
client, Queen Caroline of Brunswick, in what amounted to divorce (and
therefore adultery) proceedings:47
[A]n advocate, by the sacred duty which he owes his client,
knows, in the discharge of that office, but one person in the
world, THAT CLIENT AND NONE OTHER. To save that
client by all expedient means—to protect that client at all
hazards and costs to all others, and among others to himself—is
the highest and most unquestioned of his duties; and he must not
regard the alarm, the suffering, the torment, the destruction,
which he may bring upon any other. Nay, separating even the
duties of a patriot from those of an advocate, and casting them, if
need be, to the wind, he must go on reckless of the
consequences, if his fate it should unhappily be, to involve his
country in confusion for his client’s protection!48
Thanks in no small part to Lord Brougham’s genuine threat, the charges
against the Queen were dropped.49
This is the elegance of criminal defense: when the State comes in all its
might against a single person, it is easy to appreciate being a friend to the
friendless. A comforter to the comfortless. An advocate for the oppressed.
In the words of the Supreme Court, “a defense lawyer”—including one
appointed by the State—“best serves the public, not by acting on behalf of
the State or in concert with it, but rather by advancing the undivided interest
of his client.”50
47. See Monroe H. Freedman, Henry Lord Brougham and Zeal, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV.
1319, 1320–21 (2006); Terry Jenkins, The Queen Caroline Affair, 1820, HISTORY OF
PARLIAMENT, https://www.historyofparliamentonline.org/periods/hanoverians/queen-carolineaffair-1820 (last visited May 5, 2019).
48. HENRY LORD BROUGHAM, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF HENRY LORD BROUGHAM,
WRITTEN BY HIMSELF, VOL. II, at 311 n.* (1871) (as quoted by Freedman, supra note 47, at
1322); see also GIDEON’S PROMISE SUMMER INSTITUTE TRAINING MANUAL 8–9 (n.d.) (on file
with author) (making the same claim).
49. See Freedman, supra note 47, at 1321.
50. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318–19 (1981) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Thus, concluded Justice White, a defense lawyer will attempt to “destroy” a
prosecution witness regardless of whether she thinks that witness truthful. United States v.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 258 (1967) (White, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
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Within the bounds of the law, then,51 a criminal defense lawyer owes a
firm and unyielding duty of loyalty to her client, along with duties of
investigation, confidentiality, communication and consultation, learning,
consideration, and zealous advocacy.52 In key decisions at least, the
defendant is the principal, and the defense attorney the agent.53 The
responsibilities of criminal defense counsel are, in short, considerable, but
are also reasonably well articulable. Competently working to the boundaries
of the law for only one person’s welfare is an understandable, albeit
daunting, proposition.
B. Prosecution
The definitional quandary becomes much more pronounced with the
American criminal prosecution, because we give the prosecutor enormous
discretion and only the most nebulous criterion: to do justice.54 For Robert
51. As Professor Freedman has stressed, nobody—or at least nobody who has thought it
through—denies this limitation. See Freedman, supra note 47, at 1323–24; see also Marvin
E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031, 1037 (1975)
(“The business of the advocate, simply stated, is to win if possible without violating the
law.”); CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE DEFENSE FUNCTION § 4-1.2(c) (AM. BAR
ASS’N 4th ed. 2015) (“Defense counsel should know and abide by the standards of
professional conduct as expressed in applicable law and ethical codes and opinions in the
applicable jurisdiction.”); id. § 4-1.2(d) (“Defense counsel should act zealously within the
bounds of the law and standards on behalf of their clients, but have no duty to, and may not,
execute any directive of the client which violates the law or such standards.”).
52. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984); CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STANDARDS FOR THE DEFENSE FUNCTION §§ 4-1.3, 4-3.9, 4-4.1, 4-5.1. In the words of two
Justices of the Utah Supreme Court, “Defense counsel’s [consultation] obligation is to
explain the evidence against the defendant, the nature of all defenses that might be provable,
all the various options the defendant has in pleading guilty or not guilty and going to trial,
and the possible or likely consequences of those options.” State v. Holland, 876 P.2d 357,
362 (Utah 1994).
53. See McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500, 1508 (2018) (“The Sixth Amendment, in
granting to the accused personally the right to make his defense, speaks of the ‘assistance’ of
counsel, and an assistant, however expert, is still an assistant.”) (citations omitted). Several
key decisions must be made by the defendant herself. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR
THE DEFENSE FUNCTION § 4-5.2.
54. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (“An inscription on the walls of the
Department of Justice states the proposition candidly for the federal domain: ‘The United
States wins its point whenever justice is done its citizens in the courts.’”); Berger v. United
States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (“The United States Attorney is the representative not of an
ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially
is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal
prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.”); Hurd v. People, 25
Mich. 405, 416 (1872), superseded on other grounds by People v. Koonce, 648 N.W.2d 153
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H. Jackson—United States Solicitor General and then Attorney General,
Supreme Court Justice and then Chief Prosecutor at Nuremberg—“The
qualities of a good prosecutor are as elusive and as impossible to define as
those which mark a gentleman.”55 The concept of ‘gentleman’ is as
amorphous as it is gendered anachronism, yet most would agree with
Jackson that “[t]he prosecutor has more control over life, liberty, and
reputation than any other person in America. His discretion is
tremendous.”56 Entirely unlike the defense attorney, who merely responds
to the prosecution—even if in a proactive sense—Jackson recognized that
the prosecutor
must pick his cases, because no prosecutor can even investigate
all of the cases in which he receives complaints. . . . We know
that no local police force can strictly enforce the traffic laws, or
it would arrest half the driving population on any given morning.
What every prosecutor is practically required to do is to select
(Mich. 2002) (“The prosecuting officer[’s] . . . object[,] like that of the court, should be
simply justice . . . .”); ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2003) (“A
prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an
advocate.”); ABA MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13 (1980) (“The
responsibility of a public prosecutor differs from that of the usual advocate; his duty is to
seek justice . . . .”); CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 31.2(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 4th ed. 2015) (“The prosecutor is an administrator of justice . . .”
who “should exercise sound discretion . . . .”); id. § 3-1.2(b) (“The primary duty of the
prosecutor is to seek justice . . . .”); id. § 3-1.2(f) (“The prosecutor is not merely a caseprocessor but also a problem-solver responsible for considering broad goals of the criminal
justice system.”); id. § 3-4.3(a) (“A prosecutor should seek or file criminal charges only
if . . . the decision to charge is in the interests of justice.”). See generally Bruce A. Green,
Why Should Prosecutors “Seek Justice”?, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 607 (1999). A simple
Westlaw search indicates that hundreds of courts have stated a prosecutorial duty to “seek
justice,” which is—according to the National District Attorneys Association—a prosecutor’s
“Primary Responsibility.” NAT’L PROSECUTION STANDARDS § 1-1.1 (NAT’L DISTRICT
ATTORNEYS ASS’N 3d ed. 2009), https://ndaa.org/wp-content/uploads/NDAA-NPS-3rd-Ed.w-Revised-Commentary.pdf. One commentator (favorably) compares this broad, uncertain
directive to the Jewish one to, “in all [of] your ways acknowledge [God].” Samuel J. Levine,
Taking Prosecutorial Ethics Seriously: A Consideration of the Prosecutor’s Ethical
Obligation to ‘Seek Justice’ in a Comparative Analytical Framework, 41 HOUSTON L. REV.
1337, 1340 (2004).
55. Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 24 J. AM. JUD. SOC’Y 18, 20 (1940)
(address at Conference of United States Attorneys, Washington D.C., April 1, 1940).
56. Id. at 18; see also GEORGE SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 94 (5th
ed. 1884) (“The office of the Attorney-General is a public trust, which involves in the
discharge of it, the exertion of an almost boundless discretion, by an officer who stands as
impartial as a judge.”).
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the cases for prosecution and to select those in which the offense
is the most flagrant, the public harm the greatest, and the proof
the most certain. . . . With the law books filled with a great
assortment of crimes, a prosecutor stands a fair chance of finding
at least a technical violation of some act on the part of almost
anyone.57
When we consider that Jackson was speaking in 1940, and that Congress
creates some five hundred crimes each decade, the scope of prosecutorial
discretion really begins to take shape.58 There of course remains slight
limitation on the discretion to prosecute—a prosecutor must believe she has
probable cause59 and cannot decide based upon personal animus, protected
classification, or exercise of constitutional right60—but review for such
discrimination is extremely deferential, and there is essentially no effective
limitation nor review of the decision not to prosecute (a declination).61 So,
57. Jackson, supra note 55, at 19.
58. See John S. Baker, Jr., Revisiting the Explosive Growth of Federal Crimes, LEGAL
MEMORANDUM
(Heritage
Found.,
Washington,
D.C.)
June
16,
2008,
http://s3.amazonaws.com/thf_media/2008/pdf/lm26.pdf. In the words of Erik Luna, “[I]t is
not altogether hyperbolic to say that everyone is a criminal (or at least a potential scofflaw).”
Erik Luna, Prosecutorial Decriminalization, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 785, 794
(2012).
59. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) (“So long as the prosecutor
has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the
decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury,
generally rests entirely in his discretion.”); CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE
PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-4.3(a) (“A prosecutor should seek or file criminal charges only
if the prosecutor reasonably believes that the charges are supported by probable
cause . . . .”). As an aspirational matter, the ABA believes a prosecutor should move forward
only with admissible evidence sufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and a
personal belief in that guilt. See id. §§ 3-1.1(c), 3-4.3(a), 3-4.3(d).
60. See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985) (“[T]he decision to prosecute
may not be ‘deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other
arbitrary classification,’ including the exercise of protected statutory and constitutional
rights.”) (citations omitted); CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION
§ 3-1.6 (“The prosecutor should not manifest or exercise, by words or conduct, bias or
prejudice based upon race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation,
gender identity, or socioeconomic status. A prosecutor should not use other improper
considerations, such as partisan or political or personal considerations, in exercising
prosecutorial discretion.”).
61. See Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607 (“[T]he decision to prosecute is particularly ill-suited to
judicial review.”); see also CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION
§ 3-1.2(b) (“The prosecutor serves the public interest . . . both by pursuing appropriate
criminal charges . . . and by exercising discretion to not pursue criminal charges . . . .”); id. §
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for Jackson, it is a prosecutor’s responsibility to “protect the spirit as well
as the letter of our civil liberties. . . . [T]he citizen’s safety lies in the
prosecutor who tempers zeal with human kindness, who seeks truth and not
victims, who serves the law and not factional purposes, and who
approaches his task with humility.”62
While the prosecutor must therefore be every bit as competent as the
defense attorney, we replace a singular zeal with a much more nebulous
moral humility.63 She must decide who to prosecute, and consequently who
among the believed-guilty to instead ignore. She must decide who to offer
pretrial diversion, who instead to offer an otherwise generous deal, and who
instead will go to public trial and on what charges and evidence. Enormous
discretion. And the grounds for its exercise are as broad as ‘justice’ itself.64
III. Robot Prosecution and Defense?
American criminal defense—especially for indigent persons, but hardly
better for the genuinely middle-class—is seriously flawed.65 Even if a given
3-4.4(a) (“[T]he prosecutor is not obliged to file or maintain all criminal charges which the
evidence might support.”). Cf. Bruce A. Green & Samuel J. Levine, Disciplinary Regulation
of Prosecutors as a Remedy for Abuses of Prosecutorial Discretion: A Descriptive and
Normative Analysis, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 143 (2016) (arguing that professional discipline
could do more to regulate prosecutorial discretion).
62. Jackson, supra note 55, at 19-20.
63. A prosecutor might additionally have statutory obligations to victims, such as those
enacted in so-called ‘Marsy’s laws.’ See MARSY’S LAW, https://marsyslaw.us/ (last visited
Dec. 31, 2018); see also Jeanna Hruska, ‘Victims’ Rights’ Proposals like Marsy’s Law
Undermine Due Process, ACLU (May 3, 2018, 10:00 AM), https://www.aclu.org/
blog/criminal-law-reform/victims-rights-proposals-marsys-law-undermine-due-process.
64. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-4.4(a)
(indicating sixteen permissible, non-exclusive grounds a prosecutor could consider); id. § 34.4(b) (indicating a few impermissible grounds); see also David Alan Sklansky, The Nature
and Function of Prosecutorial Power, 106 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 473, 477 (2017)
(“We want [prosecutors] to be zealous advocates and impartial reviewers of the facts, crime
fighters and instruments of mercy, law enforcement leaders and officers of the court, loyal
public servants and independent professionals, champions of community values and
defenders of the rule of law.”); see also Jeffrey Bellin, Theories of Prosecution, 108 CALIF.
L. REV. (forthcoming) (critiquing this ‘do justice’ model and offering a characteristically
thoughtful alternative, albeit one still open to many an interpretation).
65. In the words of Richard Posner,
An extensive literature criticizes as inadequate the current level at which the
defense of indigent criminal defendants in the United States is funded, noting
the low quality of much of this representation. I can confirm from my own
experience as a judge that indigent defendants are generally rather poorly
represented.
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defense lawyer is capable of great work (or at least of ‘passing’ work), she
is too often so overwhelmed by an unreasonable workload and/or by
impossible situations as to be functionally barely competent, or even
incompetent.66 Yet for reasons promoting the finality of judgments,67 and
because it is so difficult to ever know counterfactuals,68 we correct only a
fraction of the errors that occur. Even worse, many criminal defendants face
what are, practically, critical stages of their prosecution—and life—without
any attorney to represent them, because the Supreme Court has never held
bail hearings are themselves a Sixth Amendment critical stage to which the
right of appointed counsel applies.69 (They are, says the Court, a trigger of

RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 163–64 (1999)
(internal footnotes omitted). Posner provocatively continues,
But if we are to be hardheaded we must recognize that this may not be entirely
a bad thing. The lawyers who represent indigent criminal defendants seem to be
good enough to reduce the probability of convicting an innocent person to a
very low level. If they were much better, either many guilty people would be
acquitted or society would have to devote much greater resources to the
prosecution of criminal cases. A bare-bones system for the defense of indigent
criminal defendants may be optimal.
Id. at 164. Yikes! Posner concedes, however, that “[t]hese are difficult issues” and that he
“may . . . be unduly complacent about the unlikelihood of an innocent person’s being
convicted.” Id.
66. See, e.g., Rapping, supra note 21, at 515–18 (describing the impossible dilemma of
adequately representing criminal defendants in their first appearance); id. at 540–43
(describing overwhelming caseloads); see also BARTON & BIBAS, supra note 13, at 4–7, 17–
30 (describing, among other substantial problems, overworked, under-skilled, and
systemically underfunded defense attorneys); Richard A. Oppel, Jr. & Jugal K. Patel, One
Lawyer, One Day, 194 Felony Cases, and No Time, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2019), https://
www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/01/31/us/public-defender-case-loads.html (chronicling,
beautifully, the situation for one public defender).
67. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693–94 (1984) (articulating a
deficiency standard that “reflects the profound importance of finality in criminal
proceedings”); see also Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958, 1967 (2017) (noting that “the
strong societal interest in finality has ‘special force with respect to convictions based on
guilty pleas’” (quoting United States v. Timreck, 441 U.S. 780, 784 (1979)).
68. See Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 170–72 (2012) (permitting, where ineffective
assistance of counsel caused a defendant to go to trial, remedies including “the term of
imprisonment the government offered in the plea, the sentence . . . received at trial, or
something in between”). Dissenting, Justice Scalia decried a remedy of “whatever the state
trial court in its discretion prescribes, down to and including no remedy at all.” Id. at 176
(Scalia, J., dissenting). Such a bizarre remedy makes sense—if it can ever make sense—only
because it is impossible to know what would have been.
69. See Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 554 U.S. 191, 213 (2008).
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that right going forward.)70 Add to this mix (1) the transaction costs of
trying to find competent counsel if one has some money to pay (look to the
‘yellow pages’?!), and (2) that a ‘mere’ arrest can ruin a life (let alone a
subsequent prosecution, even one leading to acquittal), and things are not at
all good.
In short, our criminal justice system is heavy on the ‘criminal’ and light
on the ‘justice,’ and it is hard not to get at least a bit excited about the
potential of an army of AGI criminal defense lawyers who could bring
human-level—or even superhuman—competence to every minute (and
even every microsecond) of every representation. And because, as
developed above, a criminal defense lawyer represents solely the interests
of her client, there seems no reason in democratic theory to demand a
human being in this role.71 Indeed, to the extent that at least some humans
in criminal defense suffer an agony of decision—how can I defend her?—
an AGI robot might do better. (Or, if that agony ‘comes with the territory’
of intelligence, the AGI robot might do the same.)
Of course, human prejudice might forestall such gains. An ultimately
human judge—whether a singular judge considering a guilty plea, a
singular judge in a bench trial, or a collective jury—might be prejudiced
against such robots, and therefore against defendants represented by such
robots. In that case, we might give defendants the informed choice of
whether to proceed by defense robot; but until the prejudice could be
overcome, it might be reason enough to retain human defense lawyers,
albeit lawyers benefited mightily by robot assistance. Hopefully, any such
prejudice would be short-lived.
When it comes to robot prosecution, the picture clouds considerably.
Although we talk about it less, prosecutors also can of course be
overworked,72 and my sense is that their competence (globally speaking)
tends to be far too low given their unique, powerful role. This is where AGI
prosecutors could help. But unlike for criminal defense, it is in the very
nature of the prosecutorial role not merely to discern—what are the facts
and the law?—and to advocate—how should we feel about them?—but to

70. Id.
71. Cf. Brennan-Marquez & Henderson, supra note 5, at 156–63 (arriving at a different
conclusion for the criminal jury).
72. See generally Peter A. Joy & Kevin C. McMunigal, Overloaded Prosecutors, 33
CRIM. JUST. 31 (2018); Adam M. Gershowitz & Laura R. Killinger, The State (Never) Rests:
How Excessive Prosecutorial Caseloads Harm Criminal Defendants, 105 NW. U. L. REV.
261, 266–74 (2011).
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judge.73 In our world of draconian over-criminalization in both scope and
severity, we expect the prosecutor to decline many winnable prosecutions,
and if she did not, we would not only further swamp our already inadequate
adjudicatory systems, but we would needlessly destroy even more lives.74 A
prosecutor, then, may not be the executioner, but she is the preliminary
judge and jury. Assuming Kiel Brennan-Marquez and I are right that
democratic theory requires role-reversible judgments,75 it is not
immediately apparent that these initial, prosecutorial judgments should be
exempt from that requirement. True, prosecutorial judgments are always
followed by later role-reversible ones—a judge or jury—but it seems the
protection ought to be against the very prosecution, not merely against an
unfavorable outcome therein.76
Therefore, so long as prosecutors are making declination decisions—and
essentially unreviewable declination decisions at that—there is intrinsic
reason to keep a human in the role. But this is not to say, of course, that the
intrinsic benefits of a human prosecutor necessarily outweigh the
instrumental benefits of a machine one. It might mean, however, that the
ideal is a combination of the two, meaning every charging decision must be
considered by both a human prosecutor and a machine. If so, should any
prosecution require a ‘yes’ from both (a logical and)? This would preserve
the human ability to decline and permit the machine to function as an early
check against misguided prosecutions, but it would also potentially—
depending upon programming or particular machine intelligence—give a
machine the ability to decline, a check against undesirable prosecutions.
In the alternative, should any prosecution require only a human ‘yes’ (a
form of logical or)? If so, should the human prosecutor have to make a
written, publicly-available justification for proceeding where the machine
73. For some excellent insight into this prosecutorial judgment, see generally Máximo
Langer & David Alan Sklansky, Epilogue: Prosecutors and Democracy—Themes and
Counterthemes in PROSECUTORS AND DEMOCRACY: A CROSS-NATIONAL STUDY (Máximo
Langer & David Alan Sklansky eds., 2017); Sklansky, supra note 64; David Alan Sklansky,
The Progressive Prosecutor’s Handbook, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. ONLINE 25 (2017).
74. See generally Luna, supra note 58.
75. See generally Brennan-Marquez & Henderson, supra note 5.
76. This might be analogized to the constitutional tort doctrine of qualified immunity.
While I, like many, think the Supreme Court has qualified immunity dramatically wrong as a
substantive standard—shielding all but the “plainly incompetent”—it is sensible to protect
some persons not only from ultimate liability but further from the very trial determination
thereof. See District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589–90 (2018) (explaining the
Court’s qualified immunity standard). Indeed, at least some such preference seems right
‘across the board’ for criminal prosecutions.
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counsels against? Should that justification be made available to the ultimate
decision-maker (judge or jury)? And what about the opposite situation, in
which the machine recommends prosecution, but the human declines?
Should this, too, require a written, publicly-available justification, in order
that we can better understand—and hopefully make more fair—the
declination decision?
All of these considerations are worthy of significant thought, which I
will leave to future work. For now, the key insight is this: while there does
not seem to be inherent reason to prefer human defense counsel, there does
seem inherent reason to retain human prosecutors, albeit reason that might
be overwhelmed by instrumental machine benefits. Additionally, the lens of
potentially impending AGI might shine new light on a very old problem:
we ought to consider whether it would be possible to more precisely define
the prosecutorial role, what would be the implications thereof, and whether
we can at the very least make it more transparent and accountable.
Conclusion
When we put aside speciesism and appreciate the massive injustices in
our systems of criminal justice, we can’t help being excited about the
positive changes artificial general intelligence might permit. Yes, some
attorneys—maybe even many or most attorneys—might have to find
different jobs, realistically meaning that fewer will go into these lines of
work. This will be disruptive. But just like AGI should bring about a world
of fewer human bankers, doctors, and dentists, if these changes bring more
accurate and fair criminal justice, and if they are not otherwise intrinsically
harmful, they are to be eagerly anticipated. My preliminary claim is that
such is the case for criminal defense attorneys, and—even more
preliminarily—that the intrinsic loss in adopting robo-prosecutors might be
worth the very significant instrumental gains. Assuming progress in
artificial intelligence continues, then, we ought to think more on these
topics in order to render more likely the beneficial integration of its results.
And even before we achieve AGI—or, even if we never achieve AGI—
lesser computer intelligences might significantly aid our inadequate systems
of criminal justice. We currently know next to nothing about prosecutorial
declinations, and we expect next to nothing of prosecutors in terms of
explaining them, apart from the relatively rare cases of significant public
and political interest. And despite decades of consciousness regarding
inadequate provision of criminal defense counsel, solutions continue to
elude us. Yes, experience teaches that it would be foolish to expect too
much. But it also teaches that it would be morally opaque not to try.
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